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2 
RIVAL MODELS TO CAPITALISM: CAN THE 
NORDIC MODEL SURVIVE THE NEW GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM? 
Robbie Block 
W ith the current trends of change in the international global economy, economies 
that were traditionall y thought of as strong and independent are now being fo rced into the 
new system , such is the case with the conntries in the high performing region of 
Scandinavia. In political economics there are many diffe rent m odels for how to run an 
economy. Of these, two stand out as the predominant form of market economies, Liberal 
M arket Economies (LMEs) and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).While there is no 
definitive answer as to which of these structures of economy is better, of all the economies 
in the world there is one region of C ME's that stands out above all : Scandinavia. The 
Scandinavian countries emphasize "social partnership" , and egalitarianism.: 
Sweden, D enmark and N orway have actively contributed to the preservation 
and p rom otion of regional culture, the creation of a common labour and social 
security m arket, the development of compatible national legal systems as well as 
stringent regional environmental policy and the explo ration of trans-border 
municipal cooperation . . . 'N ordic identity is about being better than Europe' 
(Lawler, 570-571). 
Scandinavian economies are characterized as "small and export dependent" (Lawler, 
567) and heavily emphasize social spending. In short they are a social- democratic welfa re 
state. T he Scandinavian model is seen as having its own classification am ongst social-
dem ocratic welfare states however, due in large part to its efforts to make sure that people 
are valued for m o re than just their work output: 
Warranting separate classification from the general form of liberal dem ocracy, 
the Scandinavian model's distinctiveness stems in part from two core principles 
of universalism and deconU1lOdifi cation that have emerged out of decades of 
social-democratic theory and practice. It is through the granting of social rights 
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that the status of individuals VIs-a-VIS the market becom es decommodified 
because their survival is no lo nger contingent upon the scale of their labor 
power alone (Lawler, 567). 
The model works, with DelU11ark having the lowest Gini coefficient in the world and 
Sweden and Norway not far behind at four and six, respectively. Furthermore, N orway is 
rated as having the highest human development in the world, with Iceland, a country often 
associated with the Scandinavian model , ranked second, Sweden ranked fifth and D enmark 
coming in at 15th. As well , N orway D enmark and Sweden are ranked third fourth and fifth 
in overall employment , with Iceland being ranked nUlllber one. The success of the model is 
currently coming under pressure however, with new globa l markets emerging, and a strong 
European unity movem ent which threatens the very heart of the model. T he question then 
arises, in light of these pressures, can the Scandinavian m odel succeed in the new global 
economy? If one looks into what makes the model strong, one can see that the answer is 
clearly yes. 
Before examining its involvement and future in the global economy, one IllUSt first 
understand the Scandinavian m odel and what makes it strong. The success of the m odel has 
prompted many other authors to question why Scandinavian countries have had such 
economic success. One explanation , although not written initially for the Swedish case, is 
brought by Joel S. Migdal in his book Strong Societies and Vii'ak States: State-Society Relations 
alld State Capabilities ill the Third J;f/orld. In his work, Migdal argues that economic sll ccess is 
due in large part to a strong state control over the populace, arguing that ineffective state 
control, no matter how good policy is, will always fail to provide the adequate structure 
needed to form a strong economy: 
.. . the distribution of social control in society may be am o ng numerous, fairly 
autonomous groups rather than concentrated largely in the state. In other 
words, the over-all sum of authority m ay be high in the society, but the 
exercising of that authority may be fragm.ented. In this nH~lange, the state has 
been one organization among many. These organizations-states, ethnic groups, 
the institutions of particular social classes, villages, and any other, have offered 
individuals the components for survival strategies (Migdal, 28-39). 
Migdal's work fo cuses on the state, and the society and how they interact. N am ely for 
Migdal, the strength of the state is not only measured by its policies, but by its ability to 
enact these policies and to make the society reflect the leadership of the state. While Migdal's 
writings are focused mainly o n explaining why the third world has struggled to develop, his 
arguments can be used to explain why there has been such a high level of success in 
Scandinavia. When analyzing Scandinavia through Migdal's argument, it is important to look 
at two elements, the state and the society. First we will start with the state because it is the 
more basic and evident of the two principles; however it is important to remember that both 
are integral to each other in the grand scheme of the argument. Migdal identifies three keys 
to effective state leadership, emphasizing a strong, well organized center as well as an 
effective periphery represented by state and local officials: 
First is the level of the central executive leadership. Besides its own particular 
policy agenda , its concerns include mobilization of support, creating effective 
arms or agencies to carry out its will, resolving the conflicting notions of the 
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state's priorities among its agencies, and insuring its own political survival. 
Second is the level of the leadership in the central agencies of the state 
organization. These figures have their own personal and policy agendas; within 
their agencies they can use the power of appointment and patronage to forge a 
broad organizational view of the state's priorities. Finally, there are the state 
officials at the regional and local levels (Migdal, 263). 
The question then arises in exploring Scandinavia in light of Migdal's analysis; does 
the Scandinavian model fit the model of the strong state' And if so does it fit on all levels 
of the state that Migdal identifies? To answer this question, lets turn to Sweden as the model 
for the region because it is "credited with having invented the regIOn's social model" 
(Lawler, 5(8) . 
SWEDEN AND THE MIGDAL THESIS 
The Swedish ministry, which is second only to the Prime Minister, is famous for its 
equality and its being representative of the nation itself, with at times 11 of the 22 members 
of the cabinet being WOlnen. Furthermore, the cabinet is split amongst the four major 
political parties in Sweden, with the main party, the Party Centre, having eleven members 
on the cabinet. Under the cabinet falls the country's parliament (the Riksdag) which is made 
up of 349 members. Elections are held every four years and seats are won using a system of 
proportional representation - arguably the most representative form of a republic. Apart 
from the representativeness of the govermnent, it also falls into Migdal's model by being 
strong on every level and having a heavy influence on the lives and culture of its citizens. 
Sweden uses high rates of taxation and economic redistribution in order to ensure a society 
in which no one is left behind and the government is able to help ensure individual welfare 
through a vast array of social programs. This sets up a quasi dictatorship of the middle class 
in which people are funneled into a more common economic standing, which is seen as the 
most efrective form of state organization for an economy structured around full 
eluployment and controlled markets: "the dictatorship of the middle class is more efficient 
than the dictatorship of the elite" (Acemoglue, 515). This center based economy provides a 
strong framework for the government which is pervasive in most aspects of Swedish 
economic and social life. The government's effect on the day to day life of its citizens is seen 
in the social programs and care that it provides which tie the citizens to the state. Programs 
like state-run child care and universal healthcare allow the state to have a large influence on 
the Swedish society. Migdal argues that the effect of a state to alter and control a society as 
key to having a strong successful nation: "There was a driving compulsion to establish state 
social control within society, for that was the key that could unlock the doors in increased 
capabilities in the international arena" (Migdal, 23). Furthermore, the ability of the prime 
nllnister to select his cabinet and the Sl1ull size of the cabinet makes it strong and able to 
act, a key to the first principle of a strong central government which Migdal argues is a 
necessity for a successful economy. 
For Migdal however, the strength and organization of the state means nothing if the 
society is equally strong and pulling in a different direction. One of the strengths of the 
Scandinavian nations however is in their society. Scandinavian society is built on the same 
shared goals of universalism and exceptionalism, and is made up mostly of likeminded 
people: 
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The Scandinavian states form part of a very small group of genuine nation-
states relatively untouched by multi-ethnicity and l11ulti -culturalism and as such 
they are exceptional in another sense .. .. This has been underpinned in all cases 
by comparatively high levels of public consensus over core values and 
participatory democracy, as well as a thick model of citizenship (Lawler, 570). 
Scandinavian society also emphasizes a caring and welfare based system in which no 
o ne is left behind. This model of a strong aligned society very closely mirrors Migdal's ideal 
orderly non-fragmented society and is in bct key to even discussing the possibility of 
success: 
The central political and social drama of recent history has been the battle 
pitting the state and organizations allied with it against other social 
organizations dotting society's landscape. Although state leaders have aimed for 
ultimate uniform social control inside its boundaries, diverse heads of these 
other organizations have strived fiercely to maintain their prerogatives . ... This 
struggle for social control must be brought into stark relief even before we can 
begin asking why som e states have succeeded in their drive towards 
predominance and others have not. (Migdal, 27- 28). 
Therefore, the very aligned, very homogeneous society of Sweden fits well with 
Migdal's model of a society that is not fragmented and not constantly being pulled in 
difre rent directions. In fact , the Swedish population is very close to that of the original 
population of Zionists in Israel which Migdal uses as his example of the model society. The 
alignment of Swedish society coupled with the government's pervasiveness in, and ability to 
change the society make Sweden a highly compatible model to Migdal's ideal case. This 
compatibility makes Migdal's explanation a very prevalent one for why Scandinavian 
countries are highly successful , however since his book was published in 1988 there have 
been several other authors on the issue as well. 
STRONG SOCIETY? THE FOlKHELM 
One such author, who [ have already cited, is Peter Lawler, who has arguments that 
are very much in line with those of Migdal. Lawler also pins Scandinavian exceptionalism 
not on resource wealth or historical luck, but upon the organization of the state itself and 
the idea of conul1unity that is at the heart of Scandinavian society and culture: "The key 
feature of Scandinavian exceptionalism is the degree to which those policies have 
underpinned a close intermingling of public notions of COITU1lUnity, nation and state" 
(Lawler, 567). The center of these ideas Lawler points out is the Scandinavian sense of a 
shared burden in looking out for their fellow citizen's welfare: 
The metaphor commonly employed by Scandinavian ideologists to capture this 
quality has been that of the folkhelm (people 's home) .. .. 'per albin' [the father 
of Swedish social democracy] took what was originally a vague conception of 
society, which emphasized national cohesion above all , and wedded it to a 
radical programme of social reform such that the m etaphor was to become 
central to the preservation of social democratic hegemony throughout the 
region (Lawler, 568). 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/4
Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 25 
Lawler seems fa irly inline with Migdal in his view that Scandinavian society has much 
to do w ith their success, however the parallels continue when Lawler discusses his views on 
the Scandinavian state. Lawler believes that the Scandinavian state not only reflects the way 
the society thinks, but also that it helps to change and alter the society in the way that it 
wants the society to act, just like M igdal's model of success: 
If we can agree that states va ry in their internal constitution - fo r example, in 
the relationship between the state and civil society, in the social values which 
guide and legitimate governance, or in the level of public consensus that lies 
behind internal and external policies (as well as the m anner in which such 
consensus is attained) - then it seems plausible to suppose that these variations 
will impact to som e degree upon the external orientatio n of the state (Lawler, 
573). 
To illustra te his point, Lawler looks to the motivation behind most Scandinavian 
foreign policy: universalism . Lawler points out that universalism is both a cornersto ne of 
Scandinavian society and of the ideals of Scandinavian foreign rela tions, and the actual 
policies pursued are a fun ction of the actual societal desires that are expressed in votes and 
other m easures testing public legitimacy: " in other words in which a degree of authentic 
refl ective m onitoring of national policy takes place, foreign political and economic policy is 
lIIore likely subject to tests of public legitimacy" (Lawler, 573). The actual physical 
embodiment of this correlatio n between universalism on both the societal and policy levels 
can be seen when one looks at the objection which many of N orway's citizens had to 
j oining the EU. The opposition pointed to the fact that the EU 's aid policy is fa r less 
generous than that o f N orway 's itself and was not inline with N orway's desire to help the 
third world in favor of the global economic elites: 
SP [the party in opposition to j oining the EU] argued for the continuing right 
to curb market m echanisms in pursuit of social values at the national level, full 
employment as a policy objective, ecologically-sustainable development and 
continuing solidarity w ith the T hird World against the development of a 'fortress 
E urope' . . .. Furthermore, the EU 's aid policy was weighted towards the 
concerns of dono r states and the average amount of ODA as a percentage of 
GD P among M ember States was less than half of N orway's level (Lawler, 579-
580) . 
T herefore, it is clear that one can see that Lawler's views of Scandinavian 
exceptio nalism are very much alike to Migdal's in that he emphasizes the strong state 
involvem ent and the highly aligned like minded society as key to N ordic sllccess. 
SCANDINAVIA, GLOBALIZATION AND MIGRATION 
In looking at Scandinavian success through the lens of Migdal and Lawler and to test 
whether or not Migdal 's m odel applies to Scandinavia, it is im portant to look at the view 
of social scientists and economists of the changing dem ographics and societies of the 
countries. With inunigration becoming more and m ore prominent in the western world it 
is impo rtant to look at the implications that immigratio n has on Scandinavian 
Exceptionalism , especially in a state like Sweden which devotes much of its funding to every 
citizen of its nation: "focusing on the net fiscal effects, the gain from admitting immigrants 
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is computed for a welfare state with large expenditures and a large tax burden (Sweden) . .. an 
average new immigrant represents a new government loss of USD 20,500"(Storesletten, 
487). Sweden sees immigration as an investment, with annual immigration representing 
.67% of its population (Storesletten, 488), the country invests money initially in welfare and 
training only to make returns in the future from increased tax revenue. Imnligration is seen 
as a delicate issue in Sweden because of its nature as a state which spends money on its 
citizens as opposed to one which is less focused on social programs: "these results suggest 
that imnligrants to a typical welfare state such as Sweden impose on average a substantial 
fiscal burden and are less beneficial for public cofiers than imnligrants to the US" 
(Storesletten, 504). Apart from the purely economic strain on the social programs that 
immigrants have to Scandinavia, the question also arises as to whether or not the int1ux of 
imnligrants will cause Scandinavian culture and society to erode and cause a breakdown in 
the gentle balance between the countries society and state. While Storesletten does not give 
a direct answer to this question, he does give some insight when he points out that: "the 
labor market performance ofinmligrants in Sweden is poor, relative to natives" (Storesletten , 
488). While it is true that inunigrants will eventually pay ofi- their initial cost of social 
programs to the state in revenue taxes, whether or not their lower quality of work will go 
to lower the overall quality of work in Sweden is yet to be seen. 
The question of immigration's effect on the Scandinavian economy brings us to yet 
another interesting crossroads when considering Scandinavia 's roll in the global economy. In 
an age of increased integration and disappearing borders, can the Scandinavian model 
economy still succeed? Or will it be altered to fit into the new global order? In other words, 
will Scandinavian exceptionalism still be a trend even in tIus new era in which a country 
cannot help but be affected by global nurkets: 
The relevant market today - is the planet Earth and the global integration of 
technology, finance, trade and information in a way that is int1uencing wages, 
interest rates, living standards, culture, job opportunities, wars and weather 
patterns all over the world (Friednun, 27). 
Friedman views globalization as a dynanuc force for change and good, however the 
question remains on the table whether or not globalization is good for Scandinavia. 
Globalization is characterized by the bridging of markets and the permeability of a 
nation's economy by the new global financial system that has characterized the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries. Therefore, by its nature, globalization requires some sort of norm 
that countries must follow in order to survive in the new integrated system, wluch 
Friedman deems "the Golden Straightjacket", whose roots he identifies with Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan: 
When your country recognizes this fact, when it recognizes the rules of the free 
market in today's global economy, and decides to abide by them, it puts on what I call the 
Golden Straitjacket. ... The Thatcherite-Reaganite revolutions came about because popular 
majorities in these two major Western econonues concluded that the old government-
directed econonuc approaches simply were not providing sufficient levels of growth. 
Thatcher and Reagan combined to strip huge chunks of econonuc decision-making power 
from the state, from the advocates of the Great Society and from traditional Keynesian 
econonucs, and hand them over to the free market (Friedman, 104-105) . 
In other words, for Friedman, the Golden Straightjacket is the concept that free 
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flowing international capital and investors should be what determines state economic 
planning, no t traditional or idealist forms of economic thought: "There is just one global 
market today, and the only way you can grow at the speed your people want to grow is by 
tapping into the global stock and bond markets by seeking out multinationals to invest in 
your country and by selling into the global trading system" (Friedman, 112) . In order to see 
whether the Scandinavian m odel fits into the new global econo mic structure, it is important 
to first identify what the stru cture actually entails. For the definitio n of the global economic 
structure we turn once again to Friedman, who lays out the system which is based upon 
simple neo-Iiberal approaches to !narkets: 
To fit into the Golden Stra igacket a country must either adopt, or be seen as 
m oving toward, the following golden rules: making the private sector the 
primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and 
price stabili ty, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy .. . deregulating its 
economy to promote as much domestic competition as possible . .. opening its 
banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership and competition 
and allowing its citizens to chose from and array of competing pension options 
and foreign-run pension and mutual funds (Friedman, 105). 
Friedm.an's list continues and includes several other components of an open market 
economy; h owever the above mentioned workings of the ideal globalized economy are 
enough to see that the Scandinavian cases do not fit into Friedman's golden straigacket. 
With this in mind one may begin to wonder whether or not the Scandinavian cases have a 
chance in the new globalized world, or if their model of exceptionalis11l will slowly give way 
to the new global norm which has been created. 
THE NORDIC MODEL AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
In looking at the Scandinavian cases, it is helpful to look first at their integration into 
a smaller system., the new European Union, before looking at the larger global markets. It is 
also important to acknowledge that while Norway chose no t to integrate and join the 
European Union; Sweden decided that it was in its nations best interest to join the union, 
in looking at the arguments on both sides for and against joining, one can get a glilll.pse of 
what the future holds for these countries. 
First let us turn our attention to N orway, a country that said no to joining the 
European Union in 1973 and then again in a series of debates starting in 1993 . In fact , voter 
turnout was listed as the number one reason for voting by 65% of N orwegian's, in a 
contentious election in 1993 in which N orway had an uncharacteristically divisive election 
with the issue of European integration at the forefront of the issues (Valen, 1994). Coming 
up short of actual m embership, Norway has signed treaties with the European Union 
including the EU-Norway Free Trade Agreement in 1973, however there has not been 
another consideration for joining the union since the referendum failed in 1993 . T his can 
be accounted for by the Government's decision to suspend talks of joining the union for 10 
years starting in 1993 (European Commission). 
M o re interesting to study than the Norwegian case however for the implicatio ns of 
the new global system to the N ordic m odel is Sweden, not only because Sweden accepted 
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membership into the European Union, but also because of Sweden's underperfonnance in 
the 1990's. Before looking at the European Union and Sweden's roll in the Europeanization 
of the region, let us look first at the country's financial failings in the mid 1990's. Between 
1991 and 1994 the Swedish govenilllent was under control of a non-socialist government, 
which had major repercussions for Sweden's economic planning: 
The economic problems, the employers' withdrawal from corporate 
cooperation and the subsequent electoral setback tor the Social Democrats in 
1991 spelled trouble for those who looked to Sweden for guidance. Unlike its 
predecessors, the Swedish non-socialist goverJUllent that held office between 
1991 and 1994 repeatedly rej ected the Swedish model, provoking media people 
and political ac tivists and since the early 1990's there has been continuous 
reporting about and calls for necessary repair work and remodeling (Byrkjeflot, 
31) . 
Byrkjeflot, a N orwegian economist, goes on to describe the failings of the Swedish 
goverJUTlent as a misguided attempt to changing its rhetoric to " that of a European 
identity"(Byrkjeflot, 31), or in other words, to aligning with the European Union and its 
ideals. More specifically, the reforms of the dominant Conservative Party in 1991 were based 
upon neo-Iiberal economics: 
... new Prime Minister Carl Bildt, had openly canvassed the dismantling of the 
Swedish Model. In his first Speech to the new Parliament, h e declared 'the end 
of the collectivist era', in Sweden, and his ' N ew Start' program promised tax 
cuts, the reduction and privatization of welfare provision (a 'revolution by 
choice') and revisions to Sweden's neutral security policy. A major impetus for 
such changes was the bringing of Sweden into line with the rest of Europe 
(Lawler, 586). 
These economic reforms did not work well for Sweden, and marked an era of 
economic downturn for the country. Sweden's recovery came with the return of the 
dominant Social Democratic Party (SAP) , and a return to the Scandinavian model , however 
w ith the transition came calls to join the European Union, which had grown considerably 
since the membership application was first lodged in 1991. T hose leading the charge to join 
the EU were the social elites, with the division clear especially in the SAP party, which is 
traditionally very stable. The division was between the leadership which supported joining 
the EU, and the women's and youth groups in the party which stood in firm opposition to 
m embership. For the most part however, support for joining the European Union was not 
based on a hope for future progress, but on a desire of staying a part of Europe, and with 
current economics and job considerations at the forefront of benefits to joining: 
Those arguing for no thought Sweden should be a model in the old sense and 
an example to the world. Those saying yes ... did so with jobs and economics 
influencing their decision: don't let us be outside of Europe. No side argued for 
its position on the basis of a strong governing idea for the future. In other 
words, the manner in which the decision to apply for membership was made 
was itself symptomatic of an unraveling of the stable institutionalized, consensus 
culture that lay at the heart of the Swedish model which for decades has been 
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captured in the metaphor offolkhelm (Lawler, 583). 
Avoiding a turn away from the model has been a concern of the government since 
the 1970's when the Swedish economy suffered a severe downturn. Out of the recognition 
of a need to cope with global econOlnic changes, while still maintaining its core values and 
structure, came the Swedish third way or °Hcdjc VilgC115 Politik: "What analysts and policy 
makers from both sides of the political spectrum now agreed upon was that the SAP 
governments had tailed to tackle economic decline while preserving the core features of the 
exceptional state" (Lawler, 584). The question then is, can Sweden still find this third way in 
light of its membership in the European Union and the Monetary Union, or will the forces 
of globalization force Sweden and the rest of the Nordic community into the golden 
straight jacket? While it is too early to tell, one can make projections based upon historical 
examples and by testing the rival models to see if they are at all compatible. 
In recent history, there has been an idea that out of Scandinavia will emerge a new 
global order, due to the Nordic ability to lead and adapt: "Thorstein Veblen, who saw the 
northern European countries as 'late developers ' and as masters of adaptation .... Sweden and 
Scandinavia were perceived to be forming a vanguard in the inevitable march toward a new 
industrial society" (Byrkjeflot, 28-29). As Lawler points out however, the chances of the 
European Union adapting to the Scandinavian model are slim to none: 
In spite of the strength of social-democratic sentiment within the European 
Parliament, the translation of social-democratic sentiment into the 'affective 
corporatism' that produced institutional developments and egalitarian outcomes 
in the Scandinavian states is unlikely in the EU, given the diversity of its 
membership (Lawler, 589). 
THE TROJAN HORSE AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORDIC MODEL 
While it seems unrealistic that the Nordic model will beconle dominant, tllls does not 
mean that one should forget the traditional strength and flexibility of the Scandinavian 
model, not should one think that membership and the mere presence of the EU will not 
change the Scandinavian model at all, as it is evident that some changes have already been 
affected: 
Even so, the defenders of the folkhelm must see continuing cause for concern. 
The future remains unclear, but it is not inconceivable that Bildt's radical vision 
of the EU as a Trojan horse, instrumental in the emergence of a post-social 
democratic Sweden, may yet be realized not only in Sweden but also across 
Scandinavia. Public disquiet notwithstanding, the shift towards a variant of a 
Europe-wide social liberalism throughout Scandinavia appears inexorable, given 
the powerful logics of rationalization driving it and the evidence of incremental 
policy changes in a neoliberal direction in all of the Scandinavian states. As 
argued above, Sweden provides a particularly stark example of how the debate 
about Europe has contributed to the erosion of the very social consensus that 
has underpinned the historical development of Scandinavian social democracy 
(Lawler, 589-590). 
Furthermore, if one looks at the actual models comparing the new, growing, global 
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system to the ideals that represent the Scandinavian model which have already been outlined 
in this paper, one can see where the dashes in policy are evident. The Scandinavian m odel 
requires heavy goverml1ent involvement in the economy, and a broad social safety net which 
is not tied to the market. T he importance of this latter part is that it affects the entire 
Scandinavian outlook on working, in that one is seen as having value to the society outside 
of one's specific work output: 
'Political citizenship' must precede 'social citizenship', and these are in turn 
indispensable for the third stage 'economic citizenship'. Workers must be 
emancipated trom social insecurity before they can partake efiectively in 
economic democracy (Byrkj eflot, 29) . 
By distancing social programs from ones work output levels, the Scandinavian m odel 
is distancing itself trom the 'Golden Straigacket ' ideals of neo-liberalism . However, there are 
many breaks between the two, but the distancing of work output from social rewards and 
services is large because it strikes at the heart of the difle rence between the Scandinavian 
economy and the emerging world model of market driven economics: the Scandinavian 
model is simply more egalitarian. If one looks at the Scandinavian model, one will see that 
at its base is an ideal of cooperation and inner-finn conul1urucation that strikes at the heart 
of the globalization ideal of competition: 
Another development, starting with distribution economics, buyer relations and 
purchasing, later became the field of materials administration or logistics. The 
idea behind this concept was the greater potential for efficiency and 
effectiveness could be gained between rather than within firms. Increased 
bridging in inter-firm coordination would lead to a need for less buffering like 
stockpiling and smoothing (Lorange, 140). 
In short, these last two concepts of cooperation and distancing welfare benefits from 
one's working ability, fly in the face of current economic practice, however they do not 
necessarily represent a systern that will fail on the global spectrum. 
Much like how there is a difference between German business and American business, 
yet there is no real comparative institutional advantage to either o ne, this can also be said 
about the global and Scandinavian models. While the global model creates rapid growth and 
opportunity, the Scandinavian model helps to lift the entire country up, spreading profit and 
tying the w hole nation together as one cohesive group. This creates a system in which 
rewards are spread across the board and the society as a whole grows with the state. This 
once again brings us back to the original author, Migdal, and his explanation for why the 
Scandinavian model could succeed on the international level seems adequate. The original 
argument of strong state involvem ent in molding the society fits when one takes into 
account that the entire Scandinavian model is based upon an egalitarian movement of the 
state and society together as a whole, with the state serving as the driving actor to ensure 
the cohesiveness and the equality of the society. In light of Migdal however, one can see 
where the risks from EU membership arises. Apart from possible inunigration from non-
Scandinavian m ember nations that m ay affect the overall performance of their economies, 
the Scandinavian countries are threatened by the divisions which EU membership creates. 
As Lawler points out, the debate alone to join the EU caused rifts in the society and political 
parties that were previously uncharacteristic if not unheard of in Scandinavian society: 
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The EU debate has been instrumental in the further development of social 
cleavages which serve to undermine the public consensus upon which the 
development of Swedish social democracy has historically depended. This was 
iliustrJted not least by the paucity and brevity of the debate itself. Furthermore, 
the 1991 elections showed that Bildt's reform programme disproportionately 
appealed to men, especially young men. Women, who constitute the majority 
of public-sector workforce and are its primary clients, were more likely to 
support the parties long associated with the folkhelm or, altenutively, the red-
green left (Lawler, 585). 
The development of new social cleavages has brought on by debate seems to be one 
of the biggest risks for the success of the Scandinavian model , which relies so much on unity 
and a shared sense of purpose. However, while the model may be under pressure trom its 
internal reformists, as well as the external global markets, one must l' emember that the 
model is strong, because at its base is the entire society, and if the society can resist the 
pressures to split apart, then the model should survive in the new global markets. However, 
the real threats to the Scandinavian Inodel are the internal rifts which strike at the heart of 
the model's strength: its societal unity. If the country's social unity decreases, and rifts are 
formed and groups begin to challenge the state, than it will fit into Migdal's model of a 
strong society budding against the state which ultimately fails. Thus it is important when 
considering the future of Scandinavian exceptionalism to remember that the real threat is 
not external pressures, but the internal cleavages which they create. 
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